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TAKINGS, WATER RIGHTS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. Dan Tarlock*† 
INTRODUCTION:  
CLIMATE CHANGE, RISK, MORAL HAZARD, AND TAKINGS LAW 
 
 This Article examines the possible consequences of climate change on 
the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence as it applies to the non-
recognition and regulation of water rights and land rights at the land-water 
interface. Climate change poses unprecedented challenges for both our 
existing political and legal systems and will require a reexamination of 
many fundamental property and constitutional doctrines. The United States 
has faced major climate-related disasters in the past, but the lessons from 
earlier responses have limited applicability to climate change. For example, 
in the 1930s, the combination of falling crop prices, severe drought, and the 
dust storms caused by converting grasslands to wheat depopulated the High 
Plains from Nebraska to Texas.1 As with climate change, Hugh Bennett, the 
New Deal’s Dust Bowl strategist, believed that the problem “seemed like 
something caused by man, a byproduct of hubris and ignorance on a grand 
scale.”2 The Depression did produce important legislative changes such as 
mortgage moritoria, the elimination of deficiency judgments for residential 
mortgages, and the federal purchase of farms to create national grasslands 
in the Dust Bowl states.3 But, in the end, more permanent adaptation steps, 
such as moving people out of harm’s way, were rejected because the 
impacts were seen as temporary and preventable by more modest but 
                                                                                                             
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law and Honorary Professor, 
University of Dundee UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Science and Policy, University of Dundee, 
Scotland. This Article grew out of a paper presented at the International Association on Planning, Law 
and Property Rights in Dortmund, Germany, February 2010. A version of that paper will be published as 
Global Climate Change and the Stability of Property Rights, in PLANNING LAW AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
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presented at the University of Colorado Law School and Duke School of Law Climate Change and Law 
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 1. For the standard history of the disaster, see DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE 
SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S (1979). 
 2. TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED 
THE GREAT AMERICAN DUST BOWL 225 (2006). 
 3. R. Douglas Hurt, The National Grasslands: Origin and Development in the Dust Bowl, in 
THE HISTORY OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION 144, 144–47 (Douglas Helms & Susan L. Flader 
eds., 1985). 
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unsuccessful steps, such as tree barriers.4 In contrast, climate change will 
have significant, although not fully understood,5 permanent impacts on the 
earth’s surface, water supplies, and the way we live and use this stressed 
resource base. 
 To adapt to the stresses of climate change, there is likely to be more 
regulation of, and judicial limitations on, the use and enjoyment of water 
and water-related land that is impacted, or likely to be impacted, by climate 
change. Some losses cannot be avoided. Most of the steep losses of value 
resulting from climate change will likely be classified as “Acts of God.”6 
But, when legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts shift titles and 
reduce existing rights to share these scarce resources more equitably among 
competing demands, there will be takings challenges.7 
 The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides almost no 
guidance for legislators or administrators trying to adapt to climate change. 
This Article argues that climate change will require courts and legislatures 
to focus on the risks of changed use and enjoyment inherent in property 
rights and on the ability of victims to avoid the harm instead of engaging in 
moral-hazard behavior. Water rights and rights to submerged lands are the 
most amenable to adaptation because these property rights have long carried 
inherent risks of diminished use, enjoyment, and title loss due to changed 
natural conditions. The law has encouraged right holders to engage in 
moral-hazard behavior by ignoring the risks of the unrestrained exercise of 
these rights. Too often, the law encourages property owners to develop or 
overuse resources in the face of known natural hazards because property 
owners know that either the state cannot force them to avoid the hazard or 
that they will be compensated if the hazard occurs. Thus, to adapt to climate 
change, risk and moral hazard must be factored into takings jurisprudence. 
 The difficulty of this task cannot be underestimated. Current Supreme 
Court precedent offers limited precedential support for the consideration of 
risk and moral hazard, but climate change is an opportunity to introduce 
them into takings jurisprudence. Fifth Amendment law currently assumes 
that property rights are and should be stable. Therefore, it focuses on the 
impact of regulation on the victim rather than on the nature of the property 
                                                                                                             
 4. See A. Dan Tarlock, Rediscovering the New Deal’s Environmental Legacy, in FDR AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 155, 165–66 (Henry L. Henderson & David B. Woolner eds., 2005). 
 5. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE U.S. CLIMATE 
CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM 23 (2003), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/ 
stratplan2003/final/. 
 6. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 7. Takings challenges could be triggered by laws that (1) restructure existing allocation 
regimes, (2) prefer aquatic ecosystem conservation to consumptive uses, or (3) mandate the adoption of 
water conservation measures. 
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right and on the ability of the victim to minimize the adverse impacts for 
which compensation is sought.8 Nonetheless, the seeds of my argument can 
be found in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council9 and Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.10 As the 
impacts of climate change on water and related land rights become clearer, 
efforts to adapt to the impacts could provide a new, more legitimate and 
powerful justification for regulations that compel landowners to avoid 
activities that put their water and land rights at the risk of diminished 
enjoyment. 
 Part I of the Article examines the potential impact of climate change on 
the use and value of land and water rights and the possible changes to the 
attributes of property ownership that climate change may produce. Part II 
poses six pro-type cases where legislative, administrative, or judicial action 
may produce takings challenges and examines existing precedents and 
possible resolutions of the cases. The Article concludes by sketching the 
principles of a climate-change takings jurisprudence for water rights and for 
land at the water-land interface. 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE: STRATEGIES, IMPACTS, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. The Imperative of Adaptation 
 There are two strategies to address the projected adverse impacts of 
climate change: mitigation and adaptation. Most domestic and international 
efforts have focused on the theory of mitigation—the reduction of 
greenhouse-gas emissions—through either a cap-and-trade system or a 
carbon tax. However imperative it may be to roll back greenhouse-gas 
emission levels, mitigation is largely an illusion in an era of constrained 
                                                                                                             
 8. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to 
the classic taking . . . [and] focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes 
upon private property rights”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[W]hen the 
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of 
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”); Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (holding that the government’s 
“permanent physical occupation” of private property constitutes a taking, for “[s]uch an appropriation is 
perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests . . . [because] the owner has 
no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from 
possession and use of the space”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(noting that, when resolving regulatory takings claims, courts should consider both the economic impact 
of a regulation and the extent to which it interferes with the owner’s distinct investment-backed 
expectations). 
 9. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
 10. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
734 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 36:731 
 
budgets, an increasingly dysfunctional American political system, the 
weakness of international environmental law, and the resistance of large 
segments of the energy industry to switching to a non-carbon-based future. 
The United States may try a few token gestures, such as carbon 
sequestration, and throw money at alternative energy research, but the status 
quo of continued reliance on hydrocarbon energy with the resulting 
greenhouse-gas emissions seems the norm for the foreseeable future.11 
Furthermore, even if there were to be an effective international mitigation 
regime, the benefits will not manifest themselves for centuries.12 The result 
is that adaptation—taking projected adverse impacts as a given—has 
emerged as a second-best imperative. Due to the current congressional 
gridlock, responsibility for adaptation is being de facto devolved to the 
states, which have the primary responsibility for defining and allocating 
water and the use of water-related lands. 
B. Impacts on Land and Water 
 The bottom line on the impact of climate change for water is that there 
may be too little or too much, but we do not know when and where the 
adverse impacts13 will manifest themselves or their exact magnitude.14 We 
                                                                                                             
 11. Clifford Krauss, The Energy Picture, Redrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at F1. The 
global energy picture has changed dramatically in the past few years with the discovery of new oil and 
gas reserves outside the Middle East. Id. The net result “is a devil’s bargain, probably making solutions 
to climate change, and the development of renewable energy, even more difficult.” Id. 
 12. Richard Monastersky, A Burden Beyond Bearing, 458 NATURE 1091, 1092 (2009). The 
current thinking is that it will be at least 1,000 years before any serious mitigation, which is not now in 
place, will begin to produce benefits. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: 
EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 1 (2010). The latest 
research suggests that we are reaching dangerous CO2 concentrations more quickly than previous 
estimates and that the recovery time from reductions, should they actually occur, may be as much as 
1,000 years. See generally GARY BRAASCH, EARTH UNDER FIRE: HOW GLOBAL WARMING IS 
CHANGING THE WORLD 160–63 (2007) (providing information on global-warming recovery times). 
 13. Of course, there will also be winners among land-holders. Land in the northern latitudes 
may be more valuable for agriculture as the growing season lengthens or population migration increases. 
John Reilly, Climate Change, Global Agriculture and Regional Vulnerability, in GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CHANGING 
HYDROLOGICAL, PEDOLOGICAL AND PLANT PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 237 (Fakhri Bazzaz & Wim 
Sombroek eds., 1996). For example, in places as diverse as California and Namibia, prime irrigated 
agricultural land may become even more valuable as scarce water resources force the retirement of 
marginal lands. If climate change wipes out much of California’s premium wine industry, Oregon may 
be the beneficiary. M.A. White et al., Extreme Heat Reduces and Shifts United States Premium Wine 
Production in the 21st Century, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,217, 11,219 (2006). 
 14. For example, between 2005 and 2007 the Southeast United States experienced a severe 
drought that stressed Atlanta’s water supply and destroyed billions of dollars worth of crops in Alabama 
and Georgia. However, Columbia University scientists have concluded that the stresses were the product 
of regional population growth and bad planning, not global climate change. Richard Seager et al., 
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are still reading tea leaves.15 Both the consumptive and non-consumptive 
uses of water—for irrigation, municipal supply, energy production, and 
fish—will be impacted. There is a relatively firm consensus that arid and 
semiarid regions risk the net loss of stream runoff as winter snow packs 
diminish and spring and summer evaporation rates increase due to warmer 
temperatures.16 Federal and state carry-over storage projects might not be 
able to meet their municipal & industrial (M & I) or contractual irrigation 
delivery obligations in growing, water-stressed areas.17 Reduced flows will 
equally impact energy production; decreased flows create the risk of 
decreased production from thermal and hydroelectric power plants.18 
Finally, there have been many efforts to restore fish populations and aquatic 
ecosystems by providing minimum flows on many rivers. These 
experiments could be jeopardized as there will be counter-pressures to 
abandon them.  
 Predictions are cloudier for more humid areas, but there is little doubt 
that runoff patterns will be altered. Many areas in the East may experience 
intense bursts of increased runoff that will cause severe flood events, as 
occurred in 2011 due to Hurricane Irene. At the same time, these areas may 
experience lower summer water flows due to deeper, more prolonged 
droughts on major, heavily used rivers. A 2011 Report claims that in 1950, 
                                                                                                             
Drought in the Southeastern United States: Causes, Variability over the Last Millennium and the 
Potential Future Hydroclimatic Change, 22 J. CLIMATE 5021, 5022 (2009). In 2008, the National 
Research Council convened a workshop on the future of water use in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basins, and participants divided on the issue of whether all 
uses could be supplied in the future, although “[a]ttendees generally acknowledged that additional 
population growth would add further stresses to the water supply system.” JEFFREY JACOBS, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP ON WATER ISSUES IN THE APALACHICOLA-
CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT AND ALABAMA-COOSA-TALLAPOOSA (ACF-ACT) RIVER BASINS 5 (2009). 
 15. In 2009, much of the United States experienced wild temperature swings. For instance, the 
Ohio Valley experienced record average lows in July, while California and Nevada experienced their 
warmest month on record in September. M.P. Hoerling, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Strong 
Seasonality in 2009 U.S. Temperatures, in STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2009: SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY 140 (D.S. Arndt et al. eds., 2010), 
available at http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/bams-91-7-stateoftheclimate.pdf. However, the 
latest assessment of the world’s climate in 2009 concludes that “[s]uch seasonal extremes most certainly 
were not the result of human-induced climate change.” Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10–17 (2010); STEPHEN SAUNDERS ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLIMATE ORG., HOTTER 
AND DRIER: THE WEST’S CHANGED CLIMATE 10 (2008), available at http://www.nrdc.org/ 
globalwarming/west/west.pdf; NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER 
MANAGEMENT: EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 89 (2007). 
 17. For additional discussion of drought vulnerability in the region, see OXFAM AMERICA, 
EXPOSED: SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE US SOUTHEAST 6–8 (2009), 
available at http://adapt.oxfamamerica.org/resources/Exposed_Report.pdf. 
 18. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electric-Water Nexus and the U.S. Electric 
Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 11 (2009). 
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the chances of a record-breaking cold day or record-breaking hot day were 
even; now the chance of a record-breaking hot day is two times greater than 
a record-breaking cold day.19 Rainfall in the United States increased 7% in 
the twentieth century, and rain falling from the heaviest cloudbursts has 
increased by 20%.20 The Great Lakes are an example of a region that may 
face new stresses. A 2008 synthesis of the climate-change literature for the 
Great Lakes concludes that: 
 
Mean annual lake surface evaporation could increase by as much 
as 39% due to an increase in lake surface temperatures. This will 
present particular concern during summer and autumn, which are 
already characterized by low stream flow. Moreover, with 
increased evapotranspiration and decreased snowpack, less 
moisture will enter the soil and groundwater zones, and runoff 
will be even further decreased. Consequently, under future 
warmer and drier conditions, Great Lakes residents could become 
more vulnerable to water supply and demand mismatches.21 
 
 The greatest consumptive use of water is to grow crops or to irrigate 
grass. Thus, the climate-change impacts on land will affect the use of water. 
Therefore, some lands may become less valuable for irrigation farming or 
even dry-land farming. For example, a 2008 report estimating the yearly 
damage range to California real estate illustrates the range of landscape 
impacts of climate change common to vulnerable areas.22 Excluding 
agriculture and forests, the report estimates that climate-change damages 
will be between $0.2 and $1.4 billion for water and $0.1 to $2.5 billion 
from fire.23 The potential damage includes the risk of increased wildfires, 
sea-level rise and the resulting coastal erosion, and increased winter-storm 
                                                                                                             
 19. Hunter Cutting, Sandra Chung & Susan Hassol, Overview: Current Extreme Weather & 
Climate Change, CLIMATE COMMC’N, http://climatecommunication.org/new/articles/extreme-weather/ 
overview/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 20. Precipitation, Floods, & Drought, CLIMATE COMMC’N, http://climatecommunication.org/ 
new/articles/extreme-weather/precipitation-floods-drought/#refmark-15 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 21. Noah D. Hall & Bret B. Stuntz, Climate Change and Great Lakes Water Resources: 
Avoiding Future Conflicts with Conservation, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 641, 645 (2008). Subsequent studies 
confirm dropping water levels, in part attributed to climate change. INT’L JOINT COMM’N, IMPACTS ON 
UPPER GREAT LAKES WATER LEVELS: ST. CLAIR RIVER, at v–vii (2009), available at 
http://pub.iugls.org/en/Other_Publications/IUGLS_Final_Report.pdf. However, a new study by the same 
scientists now predicts no major impact on Great Lakes water levels from climate change. NOAA Study 
Points to Less Water Loss in Future Great Lakes Levels, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20111019_glerlwaterlevels.html. 
 22. DAVID ROLAND-HOLST & FREDRICH KAHRL, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 
CLIMATE RISK & RESPONSE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2008), available at http://are.berkeley.edu/ 
~dwrh/CERES_Web/Docs/ClimateRiskandResponse_ES.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 3. 
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flood and wind damage.24 When damage to forests and agricultural land is 
factored in, the yearly range is between $0.3 and $4.3 billion.25 
 Aquatic ecosystems will also be directly impacted. The anticipated 
flow patterns, characterized by higher highs and lower lows, may directly 
impair ecosystem functions and species composition and survival. Climate 
change will produce warmer water temperatures that will increase the risks 
of species dispersal, and more algae blooms will result in poorer water 
quality.26 For example, 
 
[a]ssuming no change in food resources, invertebrate 
production of streams and rivers may increase, potentially 
yielding more food for fish. However, higher water 
temperatures will also increase the rate of microbial activity 
and thus the rate of decomposition of organic material, which 
may result in less food being available for invertebrates and 
ultimately fish. In either case, warmer water holds less 
dissolved oxygen, so water quality will be reduced for 
organisms such as invertebrates and fish that have a high 
oxygen demand.27 
 
The bottom line is that “[e]xpected rates of climate change are probably too 
great to allow adaptation through natural genetic selection. . . . [A]quatic 
species differ greatly in their dispersal abilities, so not all species will be 
able to move to hospitable habitat.”28 
C. Consequences for Water and Related Land Rights 
 There has been little effort to examine the consequences of potential 
climate-change impacts on the private law of property entitlements 
including water rights. Historically, property and water law in civil, 
common, and mixed systems have been thought of as a set of abstract, 
universal principles that are relatively impervious to external changes in 
economic values relating to the use, enjoyment, and transfer of resources. 
Both the common and civil law protect the owner’s right to exclude (jus 
prohibendi) rather than the right to fixed value.29 The law of property and to 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id. at 7. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. N. LEROY POFF, MARK A. BRINSON & JOHN W. DAY, JR., PEW CENT. ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON 
INLAND FRESHWATER AND COASTAL WETLAND ECOSYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, at iii (2002). 
 27. Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. at 32. 
 29. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 747 (1998). 
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some extent water rights is still built on the foundation of Roman law. The 
abstract nature of property allows it to function to stimulate commerce by 
promoting title security and by decreasing the risk that other private parties 
or the state can disturb an owner’s title.30 Change does occur, but it is 
incremental and often consists of discarding doctrines that have become 
dysfunctional. Climate change increases the risk of title and enjoyment 
disturbance, and thus three possible climate-change impact scenarios are 
possible. First, the existing property doctrines can adapt to climate change. 
Second, climate change will produce new doctrines that limit the exclusive 
enjoyment of rights and mandate greater resource sharing. Third, the change 
will come from legislatures and the role of courts will be to assess the 
constitutionality of the legislation. 
 The starting point to incorporate climate change into the law of 
property is to recognize that ownership always entails some risk despite the 
emphasis on exclusion and title security. Competing claims can displace 
title due to the lack of title registration in the United States and title can be 
lost through adverse possession. Owners have always faced disasters and 
severe declines in the market value of land and water, but in general, 
disasters and value declines are assumed not to impact the legal ownership 
of property; ownership is an abstract interest in a thing and that interest 
remains as long as the thing remains.31 And, many disasters are Acts of God 
for which no one is legally responsible; compensation is an act of grace not 
duty.32 Climate change may introduce new risks to property holders, such as 
boundary shifts between private and public ownership that cause title shifts 
from private to public ownership. In other situations, the full, expected use 
and enjoyment of an entitlement will not be recognized or will be 
curtailed.33 
                                                                                                             
 30. Richard Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 7 (1990). 
 31. Early Supreme Court jurisprudence extended this risk analysis to social legislation that 
wiped out investment values that were perfectly legal when made. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 
623 (1887) (passage of prohibition legislation that destroyed the value of a brewery was not a taking 
because there was no interference with the brewery’s title). 
 32. See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 33. Carbon sequestration may be an example where the right to exclude is not fully recognized. 
Some have suggested that precedents such as Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982), may not be applied to subsurface trespass claims. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. 
Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 389–91 
(2010). Cases such as BP Chemicals v. Chance, 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996), and FLP Framing, 
Ltd. v. Texas Natural Resources Commission, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *4–5 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Feb. 6, 2003), suggest that a surface owner will not be able to invoke the normal rule that any entry 
is a violation of the right to exclude even if no damage occurs. The surface owner must establish 
damages to a current or foreseeable surface or subsurface use. The rationale is that surface owners do 
not have (and never had) a reasonable expectation to own upwards to the heavens. The expectation of 
the use of the deep subsurface may be stronger, at least for surface and mineral interest owners “already 
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 Owners in vulnerable coastal and other water-related areas face 
increased risks that pre-climate-change patterns of entitlements will no 
longer hold. A dramatic example of this is occurring in the Panhandle of 
Alaska. When the area was covered with glaciers, there was a navigable 
channel between the capital, Juneau, and a port ten miles away on the 
Inland Passage.34 Area glaciers are melting, and the channel and associated 
wetlands are silting in as the land rises due to the release of the pressure 
placed on it by the ice.35 The land that “is emerging from the water to 
replace the lost wetlands [is] shifting property boundaries and causing 
people to argue about who owns the acreage and how it should be used.”36 
 The risk level for water-right holders and land owners at the water-land 
edge has always been relatively greater than those faced by “dry-land” 
owners because the scope of a water right is defined in the context of other 
users and the state.37 Risk is inherent in the law of water rights. Water rights 
are property rights, but they are relatively incomplete compared to land 
rights.38 Their usufructuary nature subjects users to greater risks of curtailed 
enjoyment compared to land owners.39 There is a dissenting view that 
                                                                                                             
making economic use of the subsurface at the same depths as proposed CO2 sequestration, or such uses 
are subject to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.” Klass & Wilson, supra, at 411. However, 
surface owners face a more difficult burden to establish a regulatory taking for state programs that limit 
subsurface drilling or other uses to protect the integrity of a CO2 reservoir. The “pore” estate might be 
severed from the rest of the mineral estate and no regulatory taking found on the logic of Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495–502 (1986). On balance, Klass and Wilson 
conclude that unless there is a total deprivation of all economic use, “it is unlikely a court would find 
that regulations restricting some portion of the surface or subsurface would constitute a taking.” Klass & 
Wilson, supra, at 417. 
 34. Cornelia Dean, As Alaska Glaciers Melt, It’s Land That’s Rising, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2009, at A1. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Shelly Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 49, 61 (2010); Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. 
L. REV. 679, 707 (2008). 
 38. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 492–93 (Haw. 2000). 
 It is generally recognized that a simple private ownership model of 
property is conceptually incompatible with the actualities of natural watercourses. 
Rather, the variable and transient nature of the resource, as well as the necessity 
of preserving its purity and flow for others who are entitled to its use and 
enjoyment have led to water rights being uniformly regarded as usufruct[ua]ry 
and correlative in nature. 
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 305–06 
(Haw. 1982)). 
 39. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) (noting that water rights enjoy less constitutional protection than other 
rights because (1) they are subject to “original public prior claims, such as the navigation servitude and 
the public trust,” as well as laws protecting the commons (e.g., water pollution laws); (2) they are often 
limited to beneficial or non-wasteful uses, unlike other species of property rights; and (3) to the extent 
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denies the “water-is-different” theory and argues that water rights are just 
another form of property right.40 However, the consensus (and more 
accurate characterization of water rights) is that they are a different form of 
property right, and thus the Constitution affords water-right holders 
comparatively less protection compared to land owners.41 The basic reason 
is that the range of those with a legitimate interest in one person’s use of 
water is greater compared to those with a legitimate interest in one person’s 
use of land. It includes the user community, the state, and others affected by 
water use. In short, the law of water rights is another example of a property 
rights system that expressly incorporates the risk of non-enjoyment of the 
resource as well as of physical alteration into the legal right.42 Both the right 
to use water and the delineation of water boundaries carry the risk that the 
physical nature of the right, and thus its use and enjoyment, will not remain 
constant over time. All water-right holders face the risk that the entitlement 
might be curtailed due to the vagaries of climate or the demands of 
competing users and uses43 and that use rights might be—within the bounds 
of the Constitution—redefined.44 This is reflected in the general assertion 
that the public owns the waters of a territory. State ownership is a fiction for 
the assertion of the power to regulate all aspects of use and enjoyment 
rather than an assertion of full ownership.45 It means that private rights to 
                                                                                                             
that the government grants water rights through a permit, they are subject to permit constraints). Of 
course, the destruction of an easement may be an occasion for compensation. See, e.g., United States v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627–31 (1961) (holding that acquisition of land subject to a 
flowage easement entitles an easement holder to compensation for the value of land apart from riparian 
uses). 
 40. Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check: Property Rights, 
Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western Water Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
1063, 1066 (2009). 
 41. See Sax, supra note 39, at 260. 
 42. Joseph L. Sax, The Property Rights Sweepstakes: Has Anyone Held the Winning Ticket?, 
34 VT. L. REV. 157, 166 (2009). “Water law is the rare property regime where our legal system has 
explicitly confronted the time/space distinction in regard to the use of ambient resources. It illustrates 
that . . . a landowner may, or may not, have a property right to some share of those resources.” Id. 
 43. A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can Water Law Adapt to the Potential Stresses of Global 
Climate Change?, 14 DENVER WATER L. REV. 1, 7–8. “[W]ater rights are of necessity correlative, 
because water is not always available in the desired quantities due to climate variation and is uniquely 
necessary for human and ecosystem survival. . . . Of necessity, each user’s right is subject to the rights 
of other similarly situated users on a stream or over an aquifer.” Id. at 7. 
 44. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Legacy of Schodde v. Twin Falls Land and Water Co.: The 
Evolving Reasonable Appropriation Principle, 42 ENVTL. L. 37 (2012); Reed D. Benson, Alive but 
Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western Water Law, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 45. The definitive treatment of this issue remains Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership 
and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638, 640–49 (1957) (examining the “state ownership” and 
“state trusteeship” theories of water rights and water use and how these concepts have shaped the law of 
water rights in various Western states); see also Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: 
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use water are not excluded, but they are limited, usufructuary rights rather 
than full, exclusive ownership.46 
II. SIX CASE STUDIES 
A. Case One: Sea-Level Rise Inundates Private Property and the State 
Asserts That the Land Is Now Public Land Subject to the Public Trust  
 If large-scale sea-level rise occurs, large amounts of coastal property 
might become permanently submerged. Thus, states could assert public-
trust ownership of these newly submerged lands. This case is the easiest in 
which to deny compensation. The complete title shift from private to public 
ownership is a total “wipeout” and physical occupation; it does not fit the 
traditional takings cases for two primary reasons. First, the losses are not 
borne by an individual or small class of landowners, but by large numbers 
of coastal owners.47 Second, the public trust is a background common-law 
principle that property owners must expect to come into play.48 In all states, 
private-property boundaries end at the mean high or low water mark. The 
beds of lakes, rivers, and oceans are owned by the state subject to the public 
trust, and the line between public and private ownership has always been a 
shifting one. Owners take the risk that their projects will encroach on trust 
land or that private land may become inundated and subject to the trust.49  
 The doctrine that inherent limitations on title are a defense to a 
categorical taking was formally articulated in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.50 The issue in Lucas was whether a state beachfront set-
back statute could be applied to limit development on a barrier island.51 
                                                                                                             
National Interests vs. State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 
241, 255 (noting that the Equal Footing Doctrine provides that all states admitted into the Union 
subsequent to the original thirteen are admitted with the same rights as the original thirteen, which 
includes title to the beds and banks underlying tidal and navigable waters). 
 46. Dante A. Caponera, Ownership and Administration of Water Resources, in NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 83, 83–84 (2003). 
 47. Michael A. Hiatt, Come Hell or High Water: Reexamining the Takings Clause in a Climate 
Change Future, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 371, 391–92 (2008). 
 48. See e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 
356–58 (D.N.J. 1999) (no taking occurred when state regulations required a developer to maintain a 
thirty-foot walkway along the Hudson River over state trust land conveyed to private property owners 
but never severed from the trust). But cf. Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The 
Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 801–02, 806–09 
(2010) (describing the public trust doctrine and noting that, as a doctrine that courts can easily adapt to 
changing circumstances and time periods, it is well-suited as a vehicle to promote climate-change 
adaptation through the law). 
 49. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003). 
 50. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 51. Id. at 1007. 
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Lucas was an easy case for compensation because it was a simple equal-
protection case; the island was almost fully developed with unstable beach-
front stilt houses before the state decided to limit coastal development.52 
Instead of applying this rationale, the Court recognized a new category of 
categorical taking and held that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
resulted in the complete elimination of the value of property for any 
development.53 In the course of a rather rambling opinion, Justice Scalia 
allowed that there are a limited class of common-law background title 
limitations54 that can be raised as defenses to compensation. 
B. Case Two: The State Fixes Littoral Boundaries  
 Water boundaries can never be permanently fixed for two reasons. 
First, rivers, lakes, and the sea are constantly changing adjoining land, and 
second, in all countries, the state owns the submerged lands of the sea, large 
rivers, and lakes up to some boundary standard, such as the mean high tide 
line or the high water mark.55 Thus, water boundaries on lakes, rivers, and 
oceans are dynamic rather than static. Property owners may lose and gain 
soil due to rapid erosion or accumulation of the deposit of soil. The 
common and civil law classify these processes as avulsion and accretion.56 
A riparian land owner is entitled to the gradual deposit of soil that extends 
his original boundary.57 If water retreats, the land owner gains the newly 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 1008. 
 53. Id. at 1007, 1028 n.14. Prior to Lucas, only physical occupations were categorical takings. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 422 (1982) (finding a taking for an 
unconsented cable television cable on the exterior of a building). 
 54. Michael C. Blumm and Lucus Ritchie surveyed the post-Lucas cases and found that the 
background limitation defense is growing. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely 
Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 321 (2005). Many of the instances where courts invoke the defense involve resources such as 
water, id. at 342–43, 350–51, fishing quotas, id. at 357, 363, and public land, id. at 363. Professor James 
Huffman has sharply criticized an expansive reading of the background limitation doctrine. James L. 
Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years After Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 
12 (2008) (arguing that courts must maintain the defined limits of the common law to give property 
rights meaning, for if courts were to apply the “background limitations” principle expansively and issue 
“ex post declarations that the [common] law is . . . what it was not,” they would effectively “read the  
[T]akings [C]lause out of the [C]onstitution”). For a counter-critique, see Michael C. Blumm & J.B. 
Ruhl, Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian Property: A Reply to Professor Huffman, 37 
ECOLOGY Q. 805 (2010). 
 55. See, e.g., Brickell v. Trammel, 82 So. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919). 
 56. The Roman, civil, and common law origins of the doctrine are briefly traced in JOSEPH K. 
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS AND THE SOILS AND SHORES 
THEREOF 249–89 (1847). 
 57. The rationales are (1) de minimis non curat lex, (2) fairness dictates the right to accretion as 
compensation for erosion, (3) all property should have an owner and for convenience the riparian is the 
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exposed soil under the doctrine of reliction.58 Conversely, the owner may 
lose a portion of his original land if the stream course migrates landward. 
However, in rapid shifts, known as avulsion, boundaries do not shift.59 
 Efforts to deal with climate change might require the state to create 
stable water boundaries that push private-property boundaries landward. 
Florida’s legislation to do this and the subsequent takings challenge is 
instructive. The state enacted legislation that allows the state to freeze the 
public-private water boundary—the mean high tide line—to establish an 
erosion-control boundary (ECL), and declared that all artificial beach 
nourishment seaward of the ECL remains the property of the state.60 Littoral 
owners have a right of access along with the general public but no right to 
future accretions.61  
 In Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, property owners 
challenged the ECL as an unconstitutional taking of private property.62 
Although Florida had previously held that littoral rights, such as view, 
cannot be taken without compensation,63 the Florida Supreme Court 
classified view as a present right and the right to receive accretion as a 
contingent future one, which was ancillary to the right of access.64 This 
made it easier to conclude that the state had struck a reasonable balance 
between the public interest in preventing beach loss, the reduction of storm 
damage and the conservation of the shoreline, and the property owner’s 
interest in beach access.65 The Florida Supreme Court also noted that 
hurricanes are avulsive events, so the property boundary remains in place, 
but the property owner has a reasonable period of time to reclaim the lost 
land.66 Thus, the legislation simply allowed the state, as public-trust owners 
of land seaward of the mean high tide line, to do what the common law 
allows them to do.  
                                                                                                             
owner of accretion, and (4) the necessity to preserve water access. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement 
Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 211–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).  
 58. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.44 (2011); Joseph L. Sax, The 
Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 308 (2010). 
 59. Sax, supra note 58, at 308. After an exhaustive examination of the origins of the avulsion-
accretion distinction, Professor Joseph Sax concludes that it should be abolished, except in limited cases, 
and land titles should follow moving water boundaries to retain a riparian’s “water adjacency.” Id. at 353. 
 60. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.161(3)–(5) (2007); Walton County 
v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1108 (Fla. 2008) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 
161.161(3), 161.191(1)–(2) (2005)). 
 61. FLA. STAT. § 61.201; Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1108 (citing FLA. 
STAT. §§ 161.191(2), 161.201). 
 62. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1105. 
 63. See Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 64. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1112, 1119. 
 65. Id. at 1119–20. 
 66. Id. at 1116. 
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 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed because the Florida Supreme Court 
decision was consistent with “background principles of state property law. 
It did not abolish the Members’ right to future accretions, but merely held 
that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project, because 
the doctrine of avulsion applied.”67 Unfortunately, four Justices needlessly 
opened up the specter of judicial takings.68 
 Texas’s approach to avulsive changes caused by a hurricane illustrates 
that the modern notion of property remains rooted in the notion of exclusive 
dominion subject only to the duty not to cause a nuisance. Public beach 
access over private dry-sand areas has been a major issue in the United 
States, and states have developed different legal strategies to expand public 
access of the dry-sand area. Texas law recognizes public prescriptive rights 
to use private beaches up to the vegetation lines.69 A state court interpreted 
the law to mean that public prescriptive easements move with changes in 
the vegetation line.70  
 But, a recent case allowed a constitutional challenge to the rolling 
easement doctrine by a property owner whose property migrated seaward of 
the vegetation line after Hurricane Rita.71 In Severance v. Patterson, erosion 
prompted by Hurricane Rita caused two homes on Severance’s beachfront 
property to encroach upon the public “dry beach” after the vegetation line 
shifted.72 Texas courts have acknowledged a “rolling easement doctrine,” 
such that “once an easement is established, its boundaries shift with the 
vegetation line and the line of mean low tide.”73 Severance argued that 
“enforcement of the rolling easement pursuant to [Texas law] would 
effect . . . an impermissible taking without just compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment.”74 Over a strong dissent, the federal court of appeals 
judge characterized Texas law as ambiguous and uncertain, but held that a 
landowner could not bring a Fifth Amendment takings claim because the 
issue was not ripe.75 However, the majority suggested that the state’s 
attempted enforcement of the easement was arguably a Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                             
 67. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2612 
(2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 68. The literature on this aspect of the opinion is already substantial. See, e.g., Laura S. 
Underkuffler, Judicial Takings: A Medley of Misconceptions, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 203 (2011). 
 69. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011 (West 2009). 
 70. Arrington v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 38 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 71. Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 72. Id. at 494. 
 73. Id. at 493 (quoting Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 110–11 (Tex. App. 1986)). 
 74. Id. at 494.  
 75. Id. at 498–500. 
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seizure,76 and certified the question to the Texas Supreme Court.77 The 
Texas Supreme Court held that the easement did not roll with avulsion, and 
thus the state could only impose the easement by compensating the owner.78 
The common-law distinction between accretion/erosion and avulsion did 
not subject the owner to the risk of losing title.79 The distinction is often 
hard to discern. For example, Professor Sax has persuasively argued that the 
distinction be abolished,80 and climate change provides an additional 
justification for his argument. As coastal boundaries become more unstable, 
property owners must assume the greater risk of boundary change. 
 
C. Case Three: FERC Denies a Hydro License Renewal  
Because of Climate Change 
 
 Increasing water temperature and decreasing flows will put fish 
populations such as trout and salmon at risk.81 FERC has considerable 
discretion to address this issue. The Federal Power Act allows FERC to 
license hydroelectric projects on navigable streams for fifty-year terms. The 
original Act gave FERC (formerly the FPC) great discretion to license or 
not,82 and FERC granted most applications.83 FERC’s discretion was 
trimmed in 1986 when Congress amended the Federal Power Act to require 
that FERC give equal weight to the protection of fish and wildlife.84 Most 
of FERC’s hydro business involves license renewals, as many of the 
original licenses are up for renewal.85 
 Renewal proceedings reflect the changes in our perception of rivers, 
but new conditions and dam removal have been achieved primarily through 
voluntary agreements. However, FERC’s power to deny a license in light of 
changed conditions has been confirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals in a forward-looking opinion.86 In City of Tacoma v. 
FERC, the municipal licensee argued that the fish restoration and mitigation 
conditions of a new license amounted to an illegal de facto decommissioning 
                                                                                                             
 76. Id. at 502. See generally Michael Hofrichter, Texas’s Open Beaches Act: Proposed 
Reforms Due to Coastal Erosion, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 147 (2009). 
 77. Severance, 566 F.3d at 503–04. 
 78. Severance v. Patterson, No. 09–0387, 2012 WL 1059341, at *14 (Tex. 2012). 
 79. Id. at *13. 
 80. See Sax, supra note 58, at 353–54. 
 81. Jack R. Tuholske, Hot Water Streams: A Tale of Two Trout, 34 VT. L. REV. 927, 943–47 (2010). 
 82. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797 (2006). 
 83. E.g., Namekogan Hydro Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 216 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1954). 
 84. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). 
 85. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 157 (2010). 
 86. City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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order.87 After noting that federal hydro policy had changed “from a near-
exclusive focus on development to an increasing focus on environmental 
protection,” the court found “persuasive FERC’s argument that Congress 
implicitly extended to FERC the power to shut down projects either 
directly, by denying a new license, or indirectly, by imposing reasonable 
and necessary conditions that cause the licensee to reject the new license.”88 
 A FERC licensee has no takings objection to a decommissioning order 
or to the imposition of extensive fish restoration conditions.89 First, even if 
the licensee has—as the Act requires—a state water right to operate the 
project, federal approval is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of the state 
right.90 The grazing-right cases confirm that denial of a federal permit—
which is a license, not a property right—that prohibits use of a water right is 
not a taking because there is no deprivation of the water right because it 
may be transferred to other users.91 Second, a FERC licensee has no 
property right in the value of the use of navigable waters.92 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 71. 
 88. Id. at 73–74. 
 89. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76 (1913) (no compensation when a 
license to improve a navigable waterway was revoked); see cases cited infra note 91; see also Katharine 
Costenbader, Damning Dams: Bearing the Costs of Restoring America’s Rivers, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
635, 657–59 (1998). 
[H]ydropower project owners do not acquire a property interest in a site's water 
power value or in the land's value as a hydroelectric site. The cases do, however, 
suggest that when the government condemns private riparian land—the land 
alongside a riverbed—for public purposes, the Fifth Amendment takings clause 
requires compensation. But a decommissioning order . . . does not condemn any 
land for public use. By virtue of decommissioning, FERC is simply ordering the 
licensee to stop producing hydropower with the existing dam. 
Id. at 658–59 (footnotes omitted). 
 90. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Envtl. Prot. Bd., 547 U.S. 370, 374 (2006). 
 91. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807–08 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sacramento 
Grazing Ass’n, v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175, 189 (2010); Walker v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 685, 
706 (2008); Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 882, 888–92, 895 (N.M. 2007). In Sacramento Grazing, 
the U.S. Forest Service issued a series of grazing permits to the plaintiff that gradually limited the 
plaintiff’s livestock grazing activities in certain riparian exclosures and reduced the number of livestock 
that the plaintiff could graze on federal lands. 96 Fed. Cl. at 180, 183. The plaintiff brought a claim 
alleging that the government had taken his water and grazing rights without providing just 
compensation. Id. at 184. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ultimately granted the Forest Service’s 
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 189. However, the “ability to transfer” logic does allow the award 
of compensation if the government blocks all access to the right. Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 
Fed. Cl. 202, 210–12 (2008) (holding that the U.S. Forest Service “took” the plaintiff’s property within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment when it constructed fences around streams in which the plaintiff 
had a vested water right, and when it failed to remove brush and beaver dams in stream beds flowing to 
the plaintiff’s property, thereby preventing the plaintiff from irrigating his land). For an extensive 
discussion of these cases, see Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights As “Property” Through 
Takings Litigation: Is There a Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 ENVTL. L. 115 (2012). 
 92. See, e.g., Chandler–Dunbar, 229 U.S. at 74, 76 (holding that a hydropower owner acquires 
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D. Case Four: A Water-Right Holder Receives Less Water During a 
Climate-Change “Enhanced” Drought 
 A drought is the easiest case for the denial of compensation. The 
reduced availability of water during droughts is a risk that all right holders 
face. In prior-appropriation states, priority schedules determine, in theory, 
how available supplies will be distributed.93 In riparian jurisdictions, again 
in theory, shortages are shared pro rata.94 Federal and state project 
contractees are likely to suffer a percentage curtailment of their 
entitlements. Reclamation contracts explicitly provide for this 
contingency.95 
 A drought is a drought. Any drought, including a climate-change-
intensified one, is an Act of God. An Act of God has been defined as a 
casualty that is the result of “the direct, immediate, and exclusive operation 
of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or uninfluenced by the power of man 
and without human intervention.”96 In this case, there is no taking of any 
water right or entitlement when a pre-existing reduction scheme is lawfully 
administered. Human-induced events are not, of course, Acts of God.97 
Courts have consistently held that if there is human intervention, the fact 
that a natural event occurred does not immunize the actor from liability.98 
                                                                                                             
“no such vested property right in the water power inherent in the falls and rapids of the river,” and that 
when the government revoked the owner’s hydropower license, the government had to compensate the 
owner for the value of condemned riparian lands but not for the losses associated with diminished water 
power production); United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1961) (holding that 
the United States is not liable for a taking when it denies an entrepreneur use of flowing water to 
produce power because, under the Commerce Clause, “the United States has a superior navigation 
easement which precludes private ownership of the water or its flow” (citing Chandler–Dunbar, 229 
U.S. at 53, 69; United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1956)). 
 93. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 58, § 5.30. 
 94. Id. § 3.61. 
 95. Id. § 5.83. 
 96. Butts v. City of South Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); see also 
Beauton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 3 A.2d 315, 318 (Conn. 1938). 
 97. For a critique of the conventional application of the “Act of God” defense, see Jill M. 
Farley, Re-Examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 669, 683–90 (2010) (arguing that climate 
change requires that the human–nature dichotomy be replaced by a doctrine that recognizes the 
interaction between human and “natural” phenomena); see also Joel Eagle, Divine Intervention: Re-
examining the “Act of God” Defense in a Post-Katrina World, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459, 460–62 
(2007) (describing the oil and chemical spills that Hurricane Katrina caused in the Gulf Region and 
arguing that the potentially responsible parties (PRPs) should not be permitted to assert an Act of God 
defense under various federal environmental statutes—such as the Clean Water Act and the Oil 
Pollution Act—because while Hurricane Katrina was a monumental disaster, it was not the type of 
unforeseeable disaster against which Congress intended PRPs to be able to assert the “Act of God” 
defense). 
 98. See, e.g., Broyles v. Standifer, No. E2005-02791-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3497918, at *5, 
*8–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2006) (holding that the defendant created a nuisance when he erected an 
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E. Case Five: The Diversion of Water from Entitlement Holders  
to Mitigate Adverse Climate-Change Impacts 
 
 This is the hardest takings case. The diversion of water from property 
and contract holders to other uses, such as fish conservation, to maintain 
aquatic ecosystem restoration flows, or to adapt to climate change is not an 
“Act of God.” It is a government act that will trigger takings challenges. 
Climate change is increasingly a factor in water-rights litigation,99 but it has 
only been invoked in one published takings opinion.100 Based on takings 
cases where water has been diverted from agriculture to fish protection, the 
positive prediction is that takings challenges have a high probability of 
success in the Federal Circuit, but less in the other circuits.101 For example, 
there is a great divergence between the Federal Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit.102 On one level, the diversion of water to address climate change 
adds nothing to the existing law. If the government has unconstitutionally 
taken a property right, the need for the water is irrelevant. However, the 
flawed logic in the Federal Circuit’s cases is a useful template to offer an 
alternative, risk-assumption analysis of takings jurisprudence.103  
 The first case to challenge a cut-back in deliveries was O’Neill v. 
United States.104 Westlands Irrigation District, the last reclamation project 
                                                                                                             
earthen dam that blocked natural drainage patterns, causing flood damage from heavy rains produced by 
Hurricane Ivan); City of Portsmouth v. Culpepper, 64 S.E.2d 799, 802 (Va. 1951) (holding the City 
liable for damages to the plaintiff’s crops when it permitted a partially built earthen dam to remain in a 
flood canal and collect debris, thereby obstructing the flow of water and ultimately causing a flood in the 
plaintiff’s fields during a night of heavy rainfall). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases, No. 1:09-CV-1053 OWW DLB, 2010 WL 
2520946 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2010); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 
2d 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
 100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra notes 104–15 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 103. See generally John Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 579, 580–82 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court should repudiate Casitas and apply the 
Nollan–Dolan exactions test, that the plaintiffs’ claim in that case should be barred under the public trust 
doctrine, and that the California statutory requirement that dam operators provide water flows via fish 
ladders to protect fisheries represents a background principle); In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act 
Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 90 (D.D.C. 2011) (agreeing that climate change 
threatens polar bear survival, but finding the federal government’s conservation measures adequate even 
if climate change was neglected because agencies are entitled to deference when they are on the frontiers 
of science). This deference should apply equally to agency efforts to adapt to climate change. 
 104. O’Neill, 50 F.3d at 677. San Luis Food Producers v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 
1231 (E.D. Cal. 2011), relied in part on O’Neill to hold that the federal government was under no 
obligation to operate the San Luis Unit of the CVP at full capacity because the Bureau of Reclamation 
must also operate the project to benefit fish and wildlife. 
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built in California as part of the Central Valley Project (CVP), had a 1963 
contract for CVP water that exempted the government from liability for the 
failure to deliver water “arising from a shortage on account of errors in 
operation, drought, or any other causes.”105 In 1993, the Bureau of 
Reclamation announced that Westlands would get 50% of its contract 
allocation because water was needed to protect the listed Delta Smelt 
upstream.106 No taking or breach of contract was found. The court rejected 
Westlands’ argument that the clause was limited to a drought because the 
“liability limitation is unambiguous and that an unavailability of water 
resulting from the mandates of valid legislation constitutes a shortage by 
reason of ‘any other causes.’”107 
 Irrigators have fared much better in the Court of Federal Claims and 
the Federal Circuit. The leading case, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District v. United States, held that California’s reduction of State Water 
Project deliveries to comply with the Endangered Species Act was a 
physical rather than a regulatory taking because “the denial of a right to the 
use of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all value,” and “the 
government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the 
contract rights with regard to that water and totally displaced the contract 
holder.”108 This substitution constituted a “complete occupation of 
                                                                                                             
 105. O’Neill, 50 F.3d at 682 n.2. 
 106. Id. at 681. The Bureau acted pursuant to the 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 
which dedicated 800,000 acres annually to help California restore the Bay Delta and to comply with the 
Endangered Species Act. Id. 
 107. Id. at 684. 
 108. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001); see 
also David B. Anderson, Water Rights As Property in Tulare v. United States, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
461, 507 (2007) (arguing that the Tulare court erred in finding a taking because California law does not 
recognize a right to put diverted stream water to a property owner’s beneficial use); Brittany K.T. 
Kaufman, What Remains of the Endangered Species Act and Western Water After Tulare Lake Basin 
Water Storage District v. United States, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 837, 839 (2003) (arguing that the Court 
should have analyzed the claim as a regulatory rather than a physical taking). Tulare’s influence is 
visible in the 2001 litigation between the Klamath Project irrigators and the United States over the 
curtailment of water deliveries to comply with the Endangered Species Act. The Court of Federal 
Claims dismissed the suit because the irrigators had no cognizable property interests in the water, but the 
Federal Circuit asked the Oregon Supreme to answer the question “whether beneficial use alone is 
sufficient to acquire a beneficial or equitable property interest in a water right to which another person 
holds legal title.” Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 227 P.3d 1145, 1160 (Or. 2010) (en banc) 
(citing Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The Oregon Supreme 
Court answered this question “no” because “[b]eneficial use is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
to acquire a beneficial or equitable property interest in a water right.” Id. Thus, the United States is free 
to define the trust relationship between it and water-right holders within the bounds of law and the 
Constitution. The Federal Circuit then vacated the reversal and asked the Court of Federal Claims to 
determine whether compliance with the ESA made performance of the irrigation deliveries impossible. 
Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 522 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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property” that “completely eviscerate[d] the right itself,” analogous to the 
imposition of an easement over the plaintiff’s property.109  
 Purported differences in language can also control compensation. 
Stockton East Water District v. United States rejected the federal 
government’s argument that Bureau of Reclamation contracts for water 
from the New Melonies Dam were subject to subsequent federal and state 
environmental protection mandates.110 As a result, the government had no 
duty to compensate for losses suffered by contractees who did not receive 
their contractual amounts when water was diverted to fish protection during 
a drought year.111 The contracts allowed the federal government to withhold 
or reduce deliveries during droughts and “other causes which, in the 
opinion of the Contracting Officer . . . , are beyond the control of the United 
States.”112 Judge Jay Plager reasoned that the provisions were simply force 
majeure and did not apply to the subsequently enacted Central Valley 
Project Improvement Act.113 O’Neill v. United States114 had excused the 
Bureau of Reclamation in similar circumstances, but the court found the 
language in the O’Neill contract, “drought, or any other causes,” to be much 
broader.115 
 The primary barrier to the incorporation of risk and moral-hazard 
considerations is the characterization of reduced water deliveries as 
physical takings. The physical takings analysis ignores two crucial relevant 
factors. First, a delivery reduction is not a wipeout; the question is what loss 
of value the district’s users actually suffered. Second, water users have 
some capacity to adapt to reductions because this is always a risk and 
alternative supplies or conservation options may be available.116 Thus, the 
risk assumed by the users is a relevant factor. Takings jurisprudence gives 
insufficient attention to the risks that water-right holders assume. Climate 
change increases the risk level, and this increased risk ultimately should 
define the compensation to which a water-right holder is entitled. The 
closest that the Supreme Court has come to this analysis is the investment-
backed expectations test.117 The Court has expressly stated that an important 
                                                                                                             
 109. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319 (comparing the government’s invasion in United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), to water-use restrictions). Tulare was decided before Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 110. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1360–61 (emphasis omitted). 
 113. Id. at 1361. 
 114. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 677 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 115. Id. at 682 & n.2, 683–84. 
 116. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922)). 
 117. Id. at 124. 
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element of fairness is whether the victim has legitimate investment-backed 
expectations that a compensable property will be recognized.118 
 The explicit incorporation of invested-backed expectations in 1978 
indirectly introduced the idea of risk into takings law.119 The question then 
becomes: Can the state devalue property and avoid compensation because 
the property owner should have expected the regulation and not invested in 
the project or activity? The Court both limited and expanded the 
expectations analysis in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.120 The Court limited the 
principle by dismissing the argument that the purchaser of highly regulated 
property assumes the risk of development denial with the quip that “[t]he 
State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”121 
Locke himself might be surprised that his labor theory now incorporates the 
Roman law right of ius abutendi, the right to destroy property.122 The Court 
may have expanded the principle in Justice O’Connor’s increasingly 
influential concurrence with this result. She argued that the amount of 
regulation was relevant to the determination of the property owner’s 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.123 
 The power of the O’Connor analysis is illustrated by its application by 
the Federal Circuit in a variety of contexts to deny compensation. Two 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act cases upheld the suspension 
and revocation of a mining permit124 and the designation of land as 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id.; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 119. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Supreme Court identified “[t]he economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations” as the major relevant factors in deciding whether compensation is due. Id. 
 120. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606. 
 121. Id. at 627. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor argued that the property owner’s 
knowledge of the extent of regulation was an element to be considered in determining the compensation, 
if any, to which he was entitled under the interference with investment-backed-expectations standard. Id. 
at 633. On remand, the Rhode Island trial court found that the proposed fill would be a public nuisance:  
Plaintiff’s proposed residential development of the site would constitute a public 
nuisance under Rhode Island law. Plaintiff’s proposed use of the property was, 
accordingly, not a part of the “bundle of rights” acquired when he, and before 
him, SGI, obtained title to the subject parcel. Thus, the regulations complained of 
have not resulted in a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  
Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005) (citing 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)); see also J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Law 
Ecological, 58 CASE W. L. REV. 753, 776 (2008) (noting that ecosystem-service nuisances seem ready-
made for public nuisance liability). 
 122. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005). 
 123. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 124. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001). There, the Federal 
Circuit cited to Justice O’Connor’s statement that “the regulatory regime in place at the time the 
claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.” Id. at 
1350 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). The Federal Circuit went on to 
hold that the government’s revocation of the plaintiff’s mining permit under the Surface Mining Control 
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unsuitable for coal mining.125 In another case, the federal government was 
allowed to designate tidal lands around the Palmyra Atoll as a National 
Wildlife Refuge closed to fishing.126 Plaintiff claimed a prior contractual 
right to fish, but the court held that:  
 
[T]he Interior Department’s regulation does not prohibit 
commercial fishing operations on Palmyra—it merely prohibits 
commercial fishing activity in the surrounding waters. The fact 
that the government’s regulation of activities in the waters 
surrounding Palmyra may have adversely affected the value of 
their contract rights to engage in activities on shore is not 
sufficient to constitute a compensable taking.127 
 
The court characterized the regulation as another matter altogether from the 
government regulating activities on its own property, or property over 
which it has full control, even if that regulatory action disappoints the 
expectations of nearby property owners.128 CRV Enterprises Inc. v. United 
States found no physical invasion when the U.S. EPA erected a log boom 
across a slough as part of a Superfund cleanup129: 
 
Here, all of the water remains in the Slough, and plaintiffs are still 
able to use it, even if not for the particular use of navigation that 
they desired. Plaintiff’s preferred use of its property, as a launch 
for navigation into the Slough, has not even been completely 
taken away. . . . [A]bout forty percent of its shoreline still touches 
the navigable portion of the Slough and provides access to the 





                                                                                                             
and Reclamation Act did not constitute a categorical taking because the plaintiff was “engaged in a 
highly regulated industry.” Id. at 1351. In such an industry, the plaintiff should have expected that its 
ability to mine coal might be constrained because “[t]he likelihood of regulatory restraint is especially 
high with regard to possible adverse environmental effects, such as potentially harmful runoff from the 
mining operations, which have long been regarded as proper subjects for the exercise of the state’s 
police power.” Id. 
 125. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 126. Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2402 (2010). 
 127. Id. at 1366 (footnote omitted). 
 128. Id. at 1370. 
 129. CRV Enters. Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 130. Id. at 1247. 
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F. Case Six: The State Requires a Climate-Change Adaptation Strategy 
 If the ability to make more accurate climate-change impact predictions 
improves, water users may be asked to take steps to adapt to the projected 
impacts. The basic purpose will be to share shrinking supplies to the 
maximum extent possible with minimal disruption of existing entitlements. 
The closest case to raise this issue is Casitas Municipal Water District v. 
United States.131 In Casitas, the District claimed a water right to apply 
28,000 acre-feet per year to beneficial use.132 To comply with a National 
Marine Fisheries Service biological opinion (BiOp), the water district was 
required to construct a fish ladder at the intersection of a dam and canal and 
to divert between 1,349 and 3,200 acre-feet per year to supply the ladder.133 
Reversing a Court of Federal Claims decision denying compensation, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals applied the two Supreme Court decisions 
holding that the filling of Friant Dam, part of the Central Valley Project, 
permanently appropriated downstream riparian rights.134 The Federal 
Circuit also rejected the government’s argument that there is a difference 
between a restriction and a direct appropriation of property.135 
 Between Tulare and Casitas, the Court decided Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which upheld a 
thirty-two month moratorium on land development while the bi-state 
agency developed a plan to control runoff into blue Lake Tahoe.136 
                                                                                                             
 131. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 132. Id. at 1286. 
 133. Id. at 1282 n.4. 
 134. Id. at 1289–92. In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), the Court 
held that Congress authorized the CVP as a reclamation rather than a navigation project, id. at 731–38, 
and thus had to compensate for any state water rights permanently destroyed by the dam, id. at 752–54. 
The rights claimed were seasonable flood waters. Id. at 730. Justice Douglas concurred on the grounds 
that the government had a statutory rather than a constitutional obligation to compensate the property 
owners because there are no private property rights in navigable waters. Id. at 756–61 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1962), the Court analogized the construction of a 
dam as a partial taking of a servitude. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) 
(agreeing with the Court of Federal Claims ruling below that, when the government conducted low-
altitude flights over the plaintiff’s property for four years, it had imposed a servitude on the plaintiff). 
However, the Court limited the riparians to the difference between the value of their property before and 
after the operation of the dam. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 624–25. 
 135. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1290, 1292. It also rejected two “Hail Mary” government arguments: 
(1) that the Endangered Species Act did not divert water to a third party and (2) the Friant Dam cases 
involved the “undisputed exercise of the United States’ eminent domain powers.” Id. at 1293. 
 136. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 340–42 (2002). 
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However, the Casitas court held that Tahoe-Sierra applied only to 
regulatory takings, not physical takings claims.137 
 The analogy is flawed. The Court’s formalist physical invasion 
doctrine has been applied to the de facto or de jure imposition of a 
common-law servitude that interferes with the right to exclude. The 
curtailment of a seasonable delivery obligation does not disturb the 
underlying property or contract right, and thus the proper analysis is the 
Court’s temporary takings doctrine. The better constitutional standard in 
this case would be the Supreme Court nexus test for exactions.138 Exactions 
are usually imposed to offset the external costs of a specific proposed 
development, but the analysis can also apply to the duty to offset the costs 
of changed conditions. Climate change can, of course, also serve as a 
justification for finding a taking. The District invoked projected decreases 
in supply from climate change as a reason that the loss of water is a 
taking.139 
 On remand, the Court of Federal Claims conducted a damages trial, 
found that no damages had occurred, and thus did not reach the District’s 
climate-change argument.140 The District argued that the BiOp caused a 
permanent loss of 1,915 acre-feet measured by the annual reduction of the 
project’s safe yield.141 This damages measure was rejected because the 
measure of any water right is beneficial use.142 Applying this standard, the 
court essentially agreed that storage allowed the District to meet its delivery 
obligations and comply with the bypass requirements of the BiOp.143 Thus, 
the takings claim was not ripe because the District had not suffered “an 
actual reduction in beneficial use.”144 The court’s reaffirmation that a water 
right is limited to water actually applied to beneficial use is an important 
step in the incorporation of risk and moral hazard into takings law. In 
explaining why there had not been an interference with beneficial use, the 
                                                                                                             
 137. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1297–98. Judge Mayer dissented because the District possessed only a 
usufructuary rather than an ownership right to the water and only imposed regulatory operating criteria 
on the District. Id. at 1297. 
 138. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411–12 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987). 
 139. Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Factual Findings and Conclusions of Law at 8–9, Stockton E. Water 
Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 1:05-CV-00168), ECF No. 213 (citing 
Expert Report of Edward Aguado at 12, Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d. 1344 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (No. 1:05-CV-00168), ECF No. 143 (asserting that the District has no surplus water and 
climate change will aggravate its thin margin of safety)). 
 140. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 472 (2011). 
 141. Id. at 465. 
 142. Id. at 470. 
 143. Id. at 446. 
 144. Id. at 474. 
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court observed that the District continued to add customers, “has not 
changed how it allocates water to its customers, has not purchased 
alternative water supplies, has not instituted any mandatory water 
conservation measures or changed its drought contingency measures, and 
has not increased the price of the water due to the biological opinion.”145  
 Some might be upset with the court’s rejection of the public trust as a 
complete defense to a taking.146 However, the Court squarely suggested that 
the beneficial-use doctrine might require a water-right holder to take 
affirmative steps to avoid a loss caused by the need to adapt to changed 
conditions.147 The facts of Casitas do not present a classic moral-hazard 
problem. There was a forty-year lag between the time that the District 
signed a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation to obtain water from the 
Ventura River Project and the time that it was asked to construct a fish 
ladder to protect listed endangered species.148 However, as we learn more 
about climate change, the ideas of risk and moral hazard will begin to 
merge as the opinion on remand illustrates.  
 Moral hazard is a concept first developed by the insurance industry to 
avoid excessive liability in situations where the insured has the capacity to 
take preventative action but has little or no incentive to do so.149 For 
example, a home owner who obtains fire insurance has some incentive to 
engage in behavior that may increase the risk of a fire, and fewer incentives 
to refrain from activities that might cause a fire or to take preventative 
measures. To minimize the risks of this moral hazard, insurance companies 
have taken steps, such as deductibles, to incentivize property owners to be 
more careful.150 Today, moral hazard applies to any risky behavior that 
could be avoided but is not because of the expectation that such behavior 
will not be penalized.151 In fact, the behavior is often encouraged by laws 
that immunize the actor from the full or partial responsibility for avoiding 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. at 470. 
 146. The Court agreed that the public trust is a self-executing principle and that the trust applies 
to fish but rejected the government’s argument that the trust strips Fifth Amendment protection from 
water rights and that any harm to fish violates the public trust. Id. at 458–59. Instead, it set an impossible 
standard to prove a trust violation: “Defendant must . . . show that the balance between Casitas’s various 
uses and the uses identified in the biological opinion weighs in favor of the fish.” Id. at 461. 
 147. Id. at 470–74. 
 148. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 149. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 136 (8th ed. 2011); Louis Kaplow, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 537–38 (1986). 
 150. Kaplow, supra note 149, at 538. 
 151. Id. at 537. Professor Holly D. Doremus has identified four of the relevant factors that may 
play into the law of regulatory takings as it adapts to climate change. They include (1) the justification 
for the change, (2) the foreseeability and ability of property owners to adapt to change, (3) the 
abruptness of the change, and (4) the general nature of the new regulation. Holly D. Doremus, Takings 
and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 31 (2003). 
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the costs and which shift the costs to the public fisc.152 Thus, a moral hazard 
can be defined as socially undesirable or inefficient behavior that is 
encouraged either by the expectation that it will not be punished, or more 
perverse yet, that it will be rewarded.153 
 The water-right holder engaged in moral-hazard behavior by failing to 
take action that would have avoided the loss. There is no explicit 
precedential basis for the incorporation of moral hazard into the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence. But, Justice O’Connor’s treatment in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island of the risk factor inherent in Penn Central’s investment-
backed expectations standard provides the germ of a precedent.154 Risk has 
at least two dimensions. Land owners who gamble on a regulatory approval 
knowing the odds are not necessarily treated unfairly when they are denied 
the opportunity to undertake an activity with significant external costs.155 
There can also be a mitigation element to Justice O’Connor’s treatment of 
risk and investment-backed expectations. Water use is an ongoing activity 
in contrast to one-time activities such as a wetland fill. Risks are never 
constant. Thus, water users have always tried to anticipate possible risks to 
take precautionary steps to avoid them. As the remand opinion in Casitas 
instructs, climate change simply adds to existing risks, so it is unsurprising 
when users are denied full compensation for risks that could have been 
partially avoided. In some cases, it should be unreasonable for those who 
use water in ways that may adversely impact other uses to expect that they 
should be compensated for mandatory adaptation measures. 
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTION AND MORAL HAZARD 
 The need to incorporate climate change into the Supreme Court’s 
takings jurisprudence illustrates how the Court has lost touch with the core 
norm of fairness. Fairness has two dimensions: discrimination and surprise. 
Discrimination occurs when a single property owner or a small group of 
problems is singled out to bear a disproportionate burden.156 The easiest 
takings cases are usually equal-protection cases where the regulation comes 
too late to be effective. For all its questionable analysis, the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 152. POSNER, supra note 149, at 136–37. 
 153. See Peter Byrne, Property and the Environment: Thoughts on an Evolving Relationship, 28 
HARV. J. L. & POL’Y 679, 687 (2003). 
 154. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see supra 
notes 120–23. 
 155. Cf. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522–37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (retroactive coal-
miner health care liability inferred with investment-backed expectations of a company that went out of 
business in 1965). 
 156. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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Court’s much parsed Lucas opinion is a simple equal-protection case. The 
state applied a set-back to a barrier island after development on all but 
plaintiff’s lots had occurred.157 U.S. takings jurisprudence is a classic study 
in the failure to incorporate moral hazard into the law. The incentives for 
property owners to assume risks starts with the Fifth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution and continues through the well-justified expectation 
that the federal government will compensate a wide range of natural 
disasters. For example, the construction of flood-control projects and a 
federal flood-insurance program encourages over-building in high risk 
areas.158 The problem is not with the basic idea of helping victims of natural 
disasters, but with our inability to distinguish between deserving victims 
and subsidized risk-takers. The surprise component of fairness is designed 
to compensate victims of regulation who have suffered substantial and 
unanticipated losses in the value of their property, which are 
disproportionate in comparison to those suffered by similarly situated right 
holders. These candidates for compensation are, on the whole, individual 
property owners who have been required to confer public benefits, or who 
are denied equal protection of the law by regulation that comes too late to 
address the problem that triggered the need for regulation.159 Within this 
framework, there is room for the principle that climate change increases the 
risk level faced by water-right holders and provides a basis to curb moral-
hazard behavior. This increased risk and the deterrence of moral hazard 
behavior should define the compensation to which a water-right holder is 
entitled. The Court has laid the foundation by making the victim’s 
legitimate investment-backed expectations a major factor in determining 
whether a compensable property will be recognized as an important element 
of fairness. 
                                                                                                             
 157. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). 
 158. Valdis Wish, Can Insurers Cope with Climate Change?, ALLIANZ (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://knowledge.allianz.com/climate/mitigation_adaptation/?98/wwf-insurance. 
 159. See Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think About Fairness, 50 NAT. RES. J. 
455, 458–60 (2010). 
